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A. CINCLANT B. CINCLANT C. JCS MSG 1	MSG 23146 MSG 23191 1081 DTG 6	76Z AUG <i>9172 6/.</i> 16Z APR <i>5162 (2</i> 3) 1923 07Z AUG "	3 100 (70ag - Ger 61)	1.00 1000 1.00	30 EA <u>1</u>

1. REF A CONTAINED CINCLANT'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN CRISIS. THIS MSG IS ADDENDUM TO REF A AND DEALS MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO SPEED THE PLANNING PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS, IMPROVE THE REACTION TIME, AND THEREBY INCREASE OVER-ALL READINESS FOR BERLIN AND LIMITED WAR OPERATIONS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED AS A RESULT

OR CONCURRENTLY WITH A BERLIN OR SIMILAR SHOW DOWN.

"2. CURRENT CINCLANT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN THE PLANS. THESE PLANS AS WRITTEN SUFFICE; HOWEVER, CINCLANT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THEM AND IS DISTRESSED BY THE CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED TO DEVELOP A COMPLETE SET OF PLANS FOR ANY GIVEN

JCS...ACT ION(1-35)

CSA(36-37) CSAF(38-39) CMC(40-47) CNO(48-67)

**EXCLUDED FROM GDS** 

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## **NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**NAVY DEPARTMENT** 

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SITUATION. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY HERE STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT THE ATLANTIC COMMAND, WITHOUT ARMY AND AIRFORCE COMPONENTS, DOES NOT HAVE THE FULL RESOURCES REQUIRED BY A UNIFIED COMMAND. THEREFORE, THE PLANNING AND THE CONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONS SUFFERS SOMEWHAT THROUGH LACK OF LIAISON, BUT PRIMARILY THROUGH LACK OF COMMAND AUTHORITY TO GET THINGS DONE QUICKLY. UNTIL THIS AUTHORITY IS ESTA-BLISHED, A UNIFIED COMMANDER MUST RELY ON THE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OF THE COMMANDERS OF FORCES WHICH HE INTENDS TO EMPLOY IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY WHEN OPERATIONS ARE DIRECTED, THE TRANSITION TO JOINT OPERATIONS WILL BE A SOURCE OF CONFUSION. SENSITIVE INFORMATION OF FOR INSTANCE PRIOR TO OR DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF EXECUTION OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN, A UNIFIED COMMANDER REQUIRES AN AGENCY UNDER HIS COMMAND WHICH WILL SEE TO THE ALERT, ASSEMBLY AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES TO STAGING BASES AND POES. EXPERIENCE DURING THE RECENT ALERT POINTED THIS OUT QUITE CLEARLY. THE COOPERATION RECEIVED ON THIS OCCASION WAS OUTSTANDING BUT WAS UNDERSTANDABLY AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE COMMANDERS OF STATE THE FORCES WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY WORKING FOR TWO SEPARATE MILITARY COMMANDERS, THIS DOES NOT OCCUR WHEN COMPONENT, COMMANDS OF ALL SERVICES ARE ACTIVATED. RECOGNIZING THIS FACT, IN REF B CINCLANT REQUESTED ACTIVATION OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMPONENTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. JCS ACTION ON THIS REQUEST, REF C, WAS UNFA-VORABLE AND APPROVED ONLY DESIGNATION OF INTERIM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

VURABLE AND APPROVED ONLY DESIGNATION OF INTERIM COMPONENT COMMAN
THE

APPOINTMENT OF CG XVIII CORPS AND COM 19TH AF WILL INSURE PLANNIE
ASSISTANCE BY THOSE COMMANDERS; HOWEVER, THEIR DESIGNATION WOULD
SEEM TO ELIMINATE CG CONARC AND COMTAC WHO TRAIN AND PROVIDE APPOINTMENT OF CG XVIII CORPS AND COM 19TH AF VILL INSURE PLANNING SEEM TO ELIMINATE CG CONARC AND COMTAC WHO TRAIN AND PROVIDE FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL COMMAND AND THUS ACTUALLY OF PROVIDE FORCES FOR THE ATLANTIC COMMAND AND THUS ACTUALLY PERFORM SOME OF THE FUNCTIONS OF CINCLANT'S COMPONENT COMMANDERS. THEREFORE THE JCS ACTION WILL DO LITTLE MORE THAN FORMALIZE PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE WITH THE SUBORDINATE ARMY AND AIRFORCE COMMANDS INVOLVED. IT WILL NOT SERVE TO IMPROVE OR EXPEDITE APPRECIABLY THE

PLANNING FOR THE AREAS DESIGNATED.

"3. IN THE INTEREST OF IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S. FORCES FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE JCS RECONSIDER CINCLANT'S REQUEST FOR ACTIVATION OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMPOSENTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. PENDING ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS THE JCS MAY VISH TO CONSIDER THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL DUTY AS COMPONENT COMMANDERS TO COMMANDING GENERAL CONTINENTIAL ARMY COMMAND AND COMMANDER TACTICAL AIR COMMAND. SCP-2.

SCP-2.

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